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ABSTRACT
COMPARATIVE STUDIES OF NETWORK TRAFFIC
IN ACTUAL AND EMULATED WIRELESS NETWORKS
by
Curtis Salley Jr.

Wireless networks are becoming more popular in all types of environments from home
office, to business infrastructure, to mobile computing. As more of these networks
flourish, so does the attraction for hackers. The thesis examines the bandwidth of wireless
networks and the effects of intrusions in three different scenarios. First, it looks at a
wireless network that is connected to a wired infrastructure. Next, the thesis examines a
wireless ad hoc network and how bandwidth plays a valuable part in the communication
with neighboring nodes. And finally, the thesis attempts to simulate a wireless network
by using a bandwidth configuration method on a dynamic switch.
The thesis looks at the three different scenarios in two ways. First, it examines the
bandwidth utilization without any intrusion attempts. This was done in order to obtain a
baseline for analysis. Secondly, it introduces intrusions into the scenarios and examines
the effects. Data is collected for both types of scenarios and compared to determine if
there is a noticeable effect on the utilized bandwidth.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

The objective of this thesis is to show the effects of intrusion attempts on wireless
networks. Bandwidth analysis is used to determine how the network is impacted. First, I
explain the tools used to understand network traffic. Then, different types of attacks are
examined and their signatures are identified in the traces. Next, I demonstrate what was
done during my research and the type of analysis used.
Normal traffic is captured in order to give a baseline for comparison. Then attack
traffic is added and more traffic is collected to determine the effects. There are many
different types of attacks used during the simulations and their effects are different on the
network. There are several wireless setup tested including a simulated network using a
dynamic-link switch. I examine three different types. The first type that is examined is
infrastructure. This is a setup where you have wireless network as a subnet in a wired
environment. This allows nodes in the wireless subnet interact with the nodes in the
wired subnets. Secondly, I examined a wireless ad hoc network. In this setup the access
point is not used as the central point of communication for nodes. The nodes seek each
other out and communicate independently. And the final network topology used was a
dynamic-link switch, which can simulate a wireless network. Varying the available
bandwidth during testing does this.
Comparisons are done between the three different setups with respect to the
difference between their baseline and attack traffics.
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CHAPTER 2
NETWORK INTRUSION SIGNATURES AND ANALYSIS
2.1 The TCPdump Tool

In this chapter I will present many different aspects of Intrusions, Intrusion Signatures,
and Analysis. The beginning will be broader to give a general flavor of the subject. Then
I will tighten the focus to give a deeper understanding on a given topic. This will be
shown in a clear format within the progression of this paper.
This being graduate level work I will not get too involved in the basics. I just
want it to be understood that the foundation upon which the theory is about to be
represented is TCP/IP. I do not have a mastery of this subject, yet my understanding is
adequate enough to carry on an intelligent conversation/paper. With this foundation laid,
I will now start relevant information on my topic.
TCP dump and Windump are tools that help people understand the traffic on the
network. It is important to understand these items because they are the foundation that
will help you get a quick understanding of other commercial tools that may be available.
The focus at this point is on the UNIX TCPdump. The command used to run it is
tcpdump. This command reads the traffic from the network interface, usually the default
interface, and displays it on the screen. The problem with this simple format is that there
is a lot of information that will show on the screen and it can be very hard to follow
because of the rapid change. For this reason there are many different commands that can
change this default display.
Filters could be used to enable tcpdump to only collect the data desired. For
example, say we were only interested in TCP records. We can just specify that we want
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TCP. What the filter does, or has the option to do, is check the field(s) in the IP datagram
that we may want checked and look specifically for what we want, in this case TCP. The
command to do this is tcpdump 'tcp'. This is just an example of one specific field. This
process can easily become very complex, as well as restrictive, when different
combinations of fields and traits are sent. TCPdump also has a way of letting us know
that a filter is stored in a file. This is good because now we do not necessarily have to
write the total command. The option is -F filename. This filename is where the filter is
located.
Again the default behavior of TCPdump is to put the output onto the screen. If
someone is here and looking for a specific record this may be acceptable. But, most of the
time there is no one physically monitoring this information; it is data being collected for
later analysis. During this period we may want data to be collected in binary format,
sometimes called raw output. In fact, the screen output has been converted from binary
format to a human-readable format. For the purpose of analysis binary format is best
because it stores all data, not only data for the screen output. The command to collect
data in a binary format is tcpdump -w filename. To read this data, use the command
tcpdump -r filename.
Another option that must be considered is the amount of data tcpdump will
collect. The entire datagram is not collected usually. This is mainly due to the great
volume this would generate. The header is normally what is collected. The standard
number of bytes is 68. The reason for this number is shown in the picture below.

4

Figure 2.1 Sample Packet
The length can be set by the command tcpdump -s length, where length is the number of
bytes.
Now I will describe three types of TCP intrusion attempts. The first is a port scan.
There are many different reasons why this may be done. The main reason, however, has
be determined to be that someone may want to know if a particular host, or group of
hosts, have a service. Once this service is found on a host, a hacker may try to exploit the
possible weakness of this service. The fact that the ports are being scanned is obvious
from the TCPdump. A hacker that attempts this believes that no one is monitoring this
network or that the host being attacked has no way of being traced back. A person who
reads the TCPdump and understands how TCP works can easily notice this act.
The second TCP attack is another scan. The reason I call these attacks TCP
attacks is because this is the protocol on which they travel and, in fact, the strange
behavior from normal behavior of TCP is the signature that helps categorize them as
such. In the example in one the books, a look at the TCPdump may show a host is trying
to see that hosts on a particular subnet(s) has telnet available. But again, with an
understanding of TCP one can notice something is wrong. TCP has a 3-way handshake
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before a connection is made. During this process no information, in the form of data
packets, is sent. The TCPdump in this case has 4 data packets with each scan. These
packets are not dropped instead they are added/included to the data after the connection is
complete. This is a way of going around an Intrusion Detection System. Because data is
only checked after the connection is complete.
The third is the concept of hijacking a TCP session. TCP is considered to be a
safe protocol by many. This is mainly because of the need to establish a session and other
parameters needed in order for the exchange of data to occur. Yet there is software that
can sniff this session and take it over. It is easy for them to see users IDs and passwords
that are encrypted. Once a session is established the only items needed to authenticate a
host is IP number, port numbers, sequence numbers, and acknowledgement numbers. A
sniffer can easily monitor the session and get this information and take over the session.

2.2 The Mitnick Attack
Now I will give a short review of one of the most famous system intrusions. This was
when Kevin Mitnick successfully hacked into Tsutomu Shimomura's system. There were
two different techniques used in this attack. They were SYN flooding and TCP hijacking.
The SYN flooding was a method used in order to stop a host from transmitting. While
this was done TCP hijacking was used to allow Mitnick to assume the identity of that
host. The key was that he noticed a trust relationship between two computers. Once he
saw this fact, he used it to exploit that relationship to the best of his ability.
Earlier in the paper I mentioned TCP hijacking so anyone reading should be able
to follow that concept at this point. I mentioned the establishment of connections earlier,
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but now I will explain a little more in order to help others follow my explanation of this
attack just in case they do not fully understand TCP. A connection in TCP is established
via a 3-way handshake. The sender sends a SYN packet. The receiver replies with an
ACK. Then the sender replies to this reply and a connection is formed. These
connections, or sessions, are kept in a database. The size of this database is limited. Once
the database is full it cannot create any more sessions. Therefore when SYN flood is
setup by an attacker they try their best to create as many requests for the connection as
possible. The key is that they do not want to complete the connection, just flood the
queue. Of course each connection has a certain time limit. Once this time limit is reached
the connection, or attempt, is dropped. The key is, however, in the fact that once the
queue is full it can be kept full.
Mitnick was smart. He did not want to be found. His code included a fake source
address and destination address. He even went a step further to make sure that the address
that he created was one that was routable to, but not active. What would happen is that
when an address is entered the program would automatically ping it to make sure it was
routable, but not active. Before he began his complex attack he did a lot of "intelligence
gathering", called recon probes. Again, his program would send a SYN. If the host
responded, he would send a RESET. Then he would decrement by one and do it again.
The purpose of this was to get an understanding of the sequence number generator. With
this understanding, he could then predict the behavior and take the place of the machine.
In this particular case 128,000 was added to the sequence number to create the next one.
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Figure 2.2 Attacker and Victims Nodes
A problem that allowed this attack to work is the fact that things were only checked once,
usually during startup of the connection. Mitnick took the name of the computer and the
system did not notice the change of IP addresses. A way to tell that spoofing is going on
is when a route or MAC address changes during a TCP session. Also the TTL could be
another indication. If it changes dramatically during the session spoofing may be
occurring. Yet, this was a TCP attack. The IP address remained the same. Once Mitnick
took over the appearance of the host, a server in this case, the key was only to generate
the correct sequence numbers.
He sent a SYN packet to the host. The host is supposed now to respond with an
ACK. He could not see this ACK because it went to the correct server. Under normal
operation the server would have noticed that it never sent a SYN packet. Therefore it
would send a RESET packet to the host. This is where the SYN flooding comes in. The
true server is flooded and cannot respond to the SYN. The trusted connection, the ghost
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server, then sends a UNIX command that tells the host to trust all computers and users of
these computers. Once this command is sent, a FIN is sent to end the connection. The
attack is now complete and Mr. Mitnick can log on to any computer. He did clear some
of the SYN's that were flooding the true server. This was done in case other people tried
to logon to the server and got an error message he knew it would arouse suspicion.
This attack could have been prevented at many steps along the way. A firewall,
with the proper configuration or a good packet-filtering router is an easy ways to prevent
this. Also it is good to verify all information about the connection periodically during the
connection, not just once. In looking at the TCPdump, we could have noticed the initial
sequence number incremented by one, which is not done by a sequence number
generator. Other obvious things were mentioned earlier.

2.3 Fragmentation
It has been said that fragmentation has been used to both hide and carry probes and
attacks. Not all Intrusion Detection Systems and packet-filtering devices reassemble
packets. So if the signature is carrier over several datagrams they may not be detectable.
This is the reason I will discuss fragmentation at this time.
Fragmentation is normally done when an IP datagram is traveling through the
network (Internet) and the MTU of the router/network is smaller that the packet. At this
point the packet must be broken down into pieces. Each of these fragments must reach
their destination. As these fragments travel they can come across a network with even a
smaller MTU and be fragmented again. It is up to the final destination to reassemble the
packet. Each fragment must carry specific information in order to allow the reassembly to
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occur correctly. Some of these important parts include the fragment IP, the offset, and the
length of data being carried by the fragment. All fragments, except the last, must also
carry a more fragment (MF) bit to tell the destination that more data is coming. All this
information is in the IP header.
The first fragment will carry the protocol information. So devices attempting to
block fragments will block this first datagram but let the others through. This is because
the device does not keep fragment ID. They look at each fragment individually and do
not associate them with previous ones. Although this is not necessarily good practice,
economically and time wise this is the better choice. To operate the other way would
mean that each fragment must be examined and stored, which cost money. Then
fragments must either be allowed or rejected, which takes more time and resources.
TCP dump can be used to view fragmented datagrams. The book shows an
example of an ICMP echo request that was sent using three fragmented Ethernet packets.
The word frag in the output to let you know that the packet is a fragment. Each piece has
the same id, letting you know they are part of the same original datagram. A + is used to
let you know that the more fragment flag was set and there are other fragments to follow.
The last fragment has no +, yet it does have offset, as does the second one. TCPdump
does have an option not to fragment a datagram (DF). When this is set a fragmented
datagram is not allowed on the network. If one is no the network it is dropped. Either way
an ICMP error message is sent back to the sender letting them know the MTU of their
network so that the datagrams use that number at their maximum from the beginning.
Fragmentation has opened the door for many to carry out malicious acts. Some
Intrusion Detection Systems cannot be configured to handle fragmentations. A good one,
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however, correctly maintains the state, reassemble fragments and then gives you some
sort of assessment. I will describe two of the most famous ones when I discuss Denial of
Service. For now I will give a simple example. The TCP header can be fragmented in
order to try to avoid detection. The book gave an example of a fragment tcp packet of 16
bytes. (We know the minimum is the 20-byte header.) The next packet had 4 bytes, the
rest of the header. Then a final fragment followed with data. Some detection systems will
not reassemble this packet, allowing it to go though.

2.4 ICMP
I chose to add the discussion on ICMP to my paper to give a good, well-rounded feel of
the different ways that intrusions can occur. This is another simple protocol that was
created in order to have a way to relay error conditions and grant simple request. It has
been altered, however, for negative purposes and the effects have been seen on some
networks. I chose not to get too deep in the theory of ICMP because many generally
know it. I will give a review of mapping, then discuss the normal activity, and finally
malicious activity.
When planning the strategy of an attack, mapping is a very crucial part. The main
purpose, usually, of an attacker is to find live host in the network that you want to attack.
This is important because if mapping is not done, a lot of unnecessary traffic can be
generated on the network causing attention that could have a negative effect for the
attacker. Echo request is the most common mappings used. The echo reply comes back
from the target if they receive the request. An example of this is ping. Knowing this most
administrators have blocked ping. This alone is not good enough because of some TCP
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examples I have shown earlier. This mapping can be done using not only host addresses
individually, but also broadcast addresses of networks, subnetworks, and routers when
trying to find their subnet mask.
Normal activity for ICMP consists of actions and responses to these actions and
error messages. Host unreachable is an example of an error message generated in
response to a request to find a specific host for the IP address given. A router sends this
response because the host obviously cannot. When a requested port on a host is not
listening a port unreachable message is sent back to the requesting host. An
administration-prohibited message may be sent to a host who tries to access another host
but they are not on the access list of the router that needed to give this passage. A router
may send a redirect if it determines that there is a more optimal path to the desired
destination. Need to fragment is another ICMP message that is sent when a desired host
cannot be reached because the datagram is too large and fragmentation cannot be done.
This message is sent back to the sending host along with the MTU of the network so the
datagram can be of that size or smaller when they are generated. And the final one I will
discuss is the time-exceeded in-transit. This is generated in response to a TTL value that
is lower that the thresholds of the current/next hop.
Now I will give examples of malicious attacks. The first one is the Smurf attack,
which is displayed below:
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Figure 2.3 Smurf Attack
As shown in the picture a malicious host with the broadcast address of local network of
vitcim.com created the ICMP echo request. All the hosts on this network will respond to
victim.com . If there are a lot of host on this network then victim.com will be
overwhelmed, causing a denial-of-service.
Another attack is Tribe Flood Network (TEN). This is also a denial-of-service
attack. The difference with this attack is that distributor host are recruited for the attack.
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Figure 2.4 Tribe Flood Network Attack
For this attack there is a TNF master and daemon hosts. The different hosts are instructed
by the master to attack a victim via echo replies. These attacks can actually be UDP
flood, a TCP SYN flood, an ICMP echo request flood or a Smurf attack. The ICMP
identification number field in the header of echo reply gives which action to take. The
data portion is the part that sends the arguments.
The WinFreeze attack is characterized by the flooding of ICMP redirect
messages. As the host attempts to reset their routing table it becomes overwhelmed and
the performance of the host goes down. Loki is the final one I will discuss in this section
and is probably the worst of the ones mentioned. It uses ICMP as a tunneling protocol to
install Loki server. Once installed it will respond to Loki clients. These clients could send
request for passwords, files, etc.
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2.5 Denial of Service
Almost two years ago this was a very important topic. The main reason for this was the
shut down of major Internet sites such as eBay and CNN. The main focus of these attacks
is to stop the normal operations of the system. Spoofing is a key factor because it makes
finding the true attacker very hard. By spoofing I mean creating a false source address.
The denial of services will be explained in two categories. The first is brute-force attacks
and the second contains well-known attacks with elegant kills.
Brute-force attacks are well known by many major Internet companies.
Precaution should and can be taken by all, so if these attacks affect today's companies
then they are partially to blame themselves. I say this because the remedies are published,
easy to understand, and implemented by most. The key ones represented are Smurf and
Echo-Chargen. I will not go into detail about Smurf because this was done earlier. EchoChargen is an attack that focuses on UNIX systems and uses them as amplifiers. It is
described as being similar to an audience at a tennis match or ping-pong. UDP port 7 is
used. This port echoes back whatever it receives. UDP port 19 is also used. You can send
this port a character and it responds with a random string of characters. This port is a
character generator. That's how the name Echo-Chargen was formed for this attack. A
back and forth would go on consuming more bandwidth and CPU cycles as time
continues. This can be prevented by not allowing packets to go to either of these ports.
Now I will discuss attacks that have a little more finesse. The first of these
is the Teardrop. It exploits the point that the protocol stack is not the greatest at math,
particularly negative numbers. Fragmentation is the medium used to cause havoc. What
happens is that, for example, a fragment is sent with 20 bytes and offset of 0. The next
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fragment is also 20 bytes with an offset of I0. In this case the operating system would
have to rewind. The negative number can possibly be translated into large positive
numbers. This may cause the operating system to write over information in other parts of
the memory. If this is done a couple times, the system will be corrupted.
The Ping of Death is another attack with finesse. It also is a one-packet kill like
Teardrop. Although they are packets of size one, they travel in about 30 datagrams. The
code to get this to work is:
ping -1 65510 target.ip.address
This will crash an unsuspecting system. The key to get this to work is to create a packet
that is of larger size than is allowed in an ICMP packet. This size is any number greater
than 65,535. Because of fragmentation the larger ICMP packet can be sent. The receiver
will not realize until total reassembly that the packet is too large. In fact, the last fragment
is what can cause the problem. This is because if the offset is correct then it will be
allowed to continue reassembly no mater how many packets are contained in this last
fragment. The overflow can possibly cause the system to crash as well as other problems.

2.6 Summary
In this chapter I showed different aspects of attacks and signatures. The purpose was to
bring to light a beginning of understanding so that some that may not know much, or
anything, about what an attack or intrusion is and how it is carried out can have a little
knowledge. I learned a lot about this subject and I hope to carry on my interest via
research and study in other classes. I started with a general understanding of TCPdump
and the attacks that manipulate TCP, especially "The Mitnick Attack". Then I discussed
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how fragmentation is used to help disguise attacks by spreading them over several
datagrams. Another protocol used to masquerade attacks is ICMP. I explained this and
showed a couple of examples as well. The next subject was Denial of Service. Many
attacks seem to fall under this category and I only listed a few. This could have been the
subject of the paper by itself because of the number and effects of the attacks that have
been tried and still exist. Finally I discussed intrusion detection systems.
Overall this paper is a good summary of the many different aspects of the subject.
This is, however, is not meant to be the overall summary of the entire different topic that
could fall under the category of intrusions and detection. Hopefully enough explanation
was given to the different topics I did choose to discuss. If they're any gaps to fill please
feel free to seek myself or read the references cited at the end of this paper. Thank you.

CHAPTER 3
NETWORK SETUP AND TESTING
3.1 Initial Network Setup
The initial setup of the wireless network began with two laptops. They were used to
verify connectivity both between each other and the wired network. The laptops came
with Windows 95 already installed and this was sufficient for the tests that needed to be
done at this stage of the project. D-Link wireless equipment was used and the access
point was the first thing that was connected to the already existing wired network. A new
subnet was created in order to distinguish the wireless network from the wired when
necessary. A layer three switch was the tool used to inter-network the different subnets.
The design of the network was one in which the access point, which is the
pathway through which the laptops communicate with the wired subnets, was connect to
a hub, which connected to the layer three switch. Then the switch would forward packets
to what ever network necessary (see Figure 3.I).

Figure 3.1 Infrastructure Setup
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Internet Protocol addresses were assigned to each of the laptops. The subnet was
already created and I made sure that the addresses given fell within the correct range. The
D-Link software was next installed on the laptops in order to configure the wireless
cards. This configuration was needed to enable communication with either the access
point, which was connected to the wired network, or with each other. The D-Link
products that were chosen followed the IEEE 802.I1b standard. After the software was
installed I went into the D-Link control utility to set the SSID. This is what the wireless
cards used to verify that they are part of the correct network.
Under the configuration tab I made sure that the mode chosen is Infrastructure
and the SSID is Coe259. The transmittal rate is set to fully automatic to allow flexibility
regarding the flow of data. To verify that I can reach neighbor nodes I sent out ICMP
ping packets. This is done from the laptops to all the nodes in the network. Once this test
completed successfully from close proximity, I send a continuous ICMP ping (ping —t)
and test the distance limitation of the laptops with respect to the access point. Under the
Link Info tab of the D-Link control utility I can see both the link quality and signal
strength (see Figure 3.2).

Figure 3.2 Link Info
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From the computer lab I could go about I00 feet. Even when the link quality and
signal strength was very low, there was no loss of ICMP ping packets. Once I stepped out
of range, however, I was not able to communicate with the other nodes. This was a great
test because it showed that the way to test packet loss was not just based on the distance
the laptop was away from the access point, unless I stepped out of range completely.
Once this was done for the two laptops another was added to increase the amount of
nodes in the wireless environment. The same types of test were ran on the new node as
well.

3.2 Testing With Background Traffic

In order to determine the effects of the attack traffic on the network there must be a
baseline to represent the normal flow of traffic. I use background traffic to represent this
necessary information. Three forms of background traffic were used and I tested each to
verify that they would be sufficient and that they were compatible with what I want to do
regarding the behavior of normal traffic flow. FTP, HTTP, and Client Server were the
three choices selected.

3.2.1 HTTP Traffic

In the wired network background traffic was used in a similar manner in which I intended
to us it. One such traffic was HTTP. This was generated via a request for a file that
resided on a remote computer. The request was made through a web browser and the file
was a picture, either bitmap or jpeg. It was rather simple to generate this traffic. All that
was needed to be done was it input the ip address of the remote computer that has the
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desired file and the file name. This information was put into the web browser address line
and when go was pressed, or enter, the image was retrieved and displayed on the screen.
There were many images available and I wanted a continuous stream, so I created
a script that would constantly request these image files. The script would request images
one after the other with minimal delay all the way to about 100 different images. Then it
would delete the images and start the request all over again. This would continue until I
stopped the script. The script was created using a program call recorder, which allowed a
user to either capture keyboard strokes and mouse clicks, or create a script in notepad.
For this traffic, I created a program in notepad because it was much easier.
This script seemed to work very well, but it did not allow you use the computer
for other tasks once it was started. The traffic seemed okay and the overall this process
was not bad. There was no user involvement once the script was started which allowed
for consistent results each time it was ran.

3.2.2 FTP Traffic
Another form of traffic that was generated across the network was ftp. This setup was
very similar to HTTP traffic. The same files were requested from remote computers, just
in a different manner. To test this type of traffic I used the DOS prompt to transfer files
one by one. There were no problems with this task. Again, I tested the range to ensure
that the traffic could travel even at the edge of link availability within the wireless
network. Overall the tests were a success. Next I created a script to automatically run the
ftp traffic. It worked in a manner similar to the HTTP script I had generated for the
previous test. The files were transferred over the network, deleted, and then they were
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requested again. Minimum delay was used to generate higher amounts of traffic on the
network.

3.3.3 Client Server Traffic
Automatic background traffic generation is very important because the focus can be
placed on other factors that may be more relevant to your research. A Ph.D. candidate,
Jun Li, had created a program that used Pareto's distribution to determine the message
length. This was client server program in which the client sent messages to the server and
the server would return messages to the client. The range and size of the messages varied,
which made for a good example of traffic that would normally travel in a computer
network environment.
There were two programs, client and server, that worked in conjunction with each
other. The server program had to be running before the client program was started. To
start the server program was simple. All that was required was that the user specified on
which port the server would be listening, figure 3.3 show an example of this.

Figure 3.3 Server Program
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Once the server program was started the client program then had to be started.
There were a few more steps in getting this program started. There were a series of 5
questions that had to be answered before traffic was generated across the network. First
the IP address of the server program needed to be inserted. Next, the port on which the
server was listening had to be specified. After that there were three questions regarding
the parameters that needed to be set in order for the Pareto Distribution message pattern
to be set. Figure 3.4 shows the sequence along with a sample users input.

Figure 3.4 Client Program

The directions are rather simple and very user friendly. Once all the requested
information is given, message packages of random size are sent to the server. Then the
server responds with random message packets of its own. This communication between
the client and server continues until it is stopped by the user. The great thing about this
program is that it is scalable. There are many different ways this can be setup. One
example is where you can have many clients talk to one server. Another is where you can
have several servers on different nodes or even on the same node listening at different
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ports. In order to generate more traffic more clients could be added. Figure 3.5 shows a
sample of communication between the two programs. Here we see the information that is
received by the server. The same type of information is generated on the client side.

Figure 3.5 Client Server Communication

CHAPTER 4
DATA COLLECTION

In order to determine the effects of intrusions on the network, I had to first collect data.
This data fell into two categories, baseline traffic and attack traffic. The baseline was
needed as a frame of reference that would be used to determine if the attack traffic could
be noticed. It would represent the normal traffic that would occur on the network. The
collection of data was done in all three scenarios, infrastructure, ad hoc, and dynamic
switch. Attack traffic was also captured in the same manner the baseline traffic was
captured. The comparison of the two different types of traffic would occur, not only
within the scenario collected, but also with the other scenarios.

4.1 Baseline Background Traffic

The baseline traffic would represent the normal traffic that occurs across the network. In
a live network environment, this would be file transfer traffic, HTTP traffic, Internet
traffic, etc. As stated in chapter 3, I tested three different types of traffic on the network. I
collected the data on each network type and compared them side-by-side. The traffic that
seemed to be the most useful was the client server traffic. There were many reasons it
was a better choice and the mains ones were mentioned earlier. They included scalability
and ease of use.
The way in which traffic was collect was rather simple. I would run a program
called Windump and it would listen for incoming packets and collect all the data that
came. It would run in the background and needed no assistance once started. One simple
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Figure 4.1 Windump

command had to be executed in order for the data collection to begin. Figure 4.I shows
an example of the necessary command. The key was to specify the file that would store
the data. The program would be started, and then I would start the client and server
programs on the nodes that would be involved in the data collection. Data collection
would go on for some while before being stopped.
It was important to make sure that traffic was being sent and received by each
node that participated in my research. This is what made the client server programs so
important. I created a server on one node and made all the other nodes clients. In this
manner all the nodes would be communication. The clients would send information to the
server and the server would then return some information to the client. This two-way
communication would continue until I stopped it.
The next step was to read the data and get statistic from it. I used a program
named Ethereal to read the information that was collected by Windump. Figure 4.2
showed the main screen of Ethereal. All the important packet information could be found
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here. This included source address, destination address, sequence number, time, etc.
Ethereal also offered summary statistics such as packet count, average packets/sec,
average bytes/sec, elapsed time, etc. The information obtained from the data that was
collected was sufficient to determine the baseline for my comparison. This test was
repeated for all the scenario types.

Figure 4.2 Ethereal

4.2 Attack Traffic

Once the baseline was established, I worked on the different type of attacks that I would
attempt to use. I thought of several approaches. Attacks come in many forms and fall
under many categories, but the one I chose to focus on was Denial of Service in the form
of bandwidth consumption. In order to implement the attack I had to use two steps. The
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first step was to determine what nodes were reachable and available for attack. The
second step was the actual attack itself.

4.2.1 Node Identification
In this, the first step, I represented a hacker who wanted to know what nodes were
available to be accessed. This information could have been found in many different ways.
I could have determined just the IP addresses of the nodes, what operating system they
were running, what ports were open, etc. All of the above choices seemed very valuable;
therefore I made them all available to be chosen. This was done through a script I created
which asked a few simple questions regarding the type of information that you wanted to
capture. The script not only asked you what information you wanted, but it also saved the
information in several different files.
The script was created through a program called recorder and used the services of
two other programs called Nmap and Windump. The recorder program would have to be
started by the user and then the correct script would have to be loaded. It started off by
asking you for a name that would be used label all the files that would be collected as
shown in Figure 4.3. All the screens were similar to this one. The user would input the

Figure 4.3 File name request
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information in the box provided and then pressed OK. The next screen would ask for the
ip address of the network or particular node you would like to explore. The user would
input the necessary information again and pressed OK. Then it would give the user a list
of options regarding the type of scan it they would like to perform. Figure 4.4 shows this
screen and as you can see there are eight different choices to choose from. The next
screen would vary depending of the type of scan you had chosen.

Figure 4.4 Scan Options
After a few more screens that helped to better define the type of attack that was
done, the script displayed a final screen, which gave the location of the different files that
were saved (see Figure 4.5).

Figure 4.5 File locator
Each file held different information. The Nmap_output file held the results of the scan
that was done. The scenario file held all the information that you requested to be done in
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the attack. The Windump=1file held all the packets that came to the node, which were the
results of the Windump program. All the different files still had the same name just
different extensions. The information that was collected was then used for the next step
of the attack process.

4.2.2 Bandwidth Consumption
Now that all nodes were identified with the necessary information, the next step of the
attack process was to use this information to attempt to create a denial of service to the
node, or nodes in question. There were many different tools available for me to use to
generate enough traffic to get the results I wanted. My main package of choice, after
many tests, was called Devine Intervention. This one package had many different tools
that generated attacks in many different forms. It could attack a specific port of a node
and could send packets of variable sizes in specified amounts, etc.
I used a tool named FLOODz from the Devine Intervention package. In this tool I
am able to specify the ip address of the victim, the packet size, and the number of threads
I would like to have sent. Figure 4.6 shows what the interface looks like. It is a rather

Figure 4.6 FLOODz Interface
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simple program that is began by pressing start and ended by pressing halt, which is in the
same position as start once the program is started. Packets of the size specified are
continuously sent to the designated ip address causing the result of a lot of traffic being
sent to the specified host. I ran this program in all three different scenarios and the data
was collected. At the same time this program was running, the background server client
programs were running. Therefore, the data is a combination of both background and
attack traffic. The key now would be to determine if the results would show any
difference on the bandwidth of the network.

CHAPTER 5
DATA ANALYSIS AND COMPARISON
5.1 Analysis of Background and Attack Traffic in Same Scenario

Two types of data were collected for each scenario. The first type was the baseline
network traffic and the second type was attack and baseline traffic. The baseline network
is a representation of what the normal traffic pattern would look like during normal
operation. This would be the bar by which the attack traffic would be measured. An
analysis of each type of traffic is done for each scenario and finally a comparison is done
between the different scenarios.

5.1.1 Infrastructure Network

The first network on which I collected data was the infrastructure network. This network,
which is shown in Appendix A, had one of the nodes in the wireless network setup as the
server while the other nodes represented clients and sent messages to the server. The
server would then answer with messages of variable length. Figure 5.I below shows a
sample data time plot. As you can see, the data remained relatively consistent throughout
this period of the test and was in line with what I expected. There were no changes while
the client server programs were running. The server node was on a wireless laptop, so I
roamed the hallways near the lab to test the range. At no time did I go outside the range.
The lowest I let the signal strength and link quality get was 6%. No packets were dropped
and there was no delay noticed during the analysis of this data collected. The average
traffic was 23 kbps, while the maximum value was 1.4 Mbps. It can easily be seen in the
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figure that the traffic follows the same pattern through the collection, with only a few
packets going far away from the average.

Figure 5.1 Infrastructure Background Data

Figure 5.2 Infrastructure Attack Data

The attack traffic was collected in the same manner that the background traffic
was collected. As stated in Chapter 4, I used the FLOODz program to implement the
attack. Figure 5.2 shows the results of the data collected from the attack. Looking at the

33
figure there are two main things to notice. The first is that the average traffic was 1.8
Mbps. This average is very high compared to the background traffic and is a strong
indication that there is suspicious traffic on the network. The second is the gaps in the
data pattern. These gaps represent a loss of data throughput. The periods between 0 and
54 seconds and between 440 and 473 have 0 or minimum through put of bits. The attack
was so effective that it inhibited the flow of data during these, as well as other, periods.

5.1.2 Ad hoc Network
This network functioned without the use of an access point or communication with other
networks. The network setup, which is in Appendix B, shows that the individual nodes
interacted with each other independently. Each node scanned the different channels every
5 seconds for other nodes that had the same SSID. This was the determining factor on
whether they could interact or not. Unlike when the wireless laptops were in
infrastructure mode, there is not a link quality and signal strength meter to determine the
values of these parameters. This made roaming a little more difficult.
Data was collected in the same manner it was collect for infrastructure. The only
difference in this scenario is the amount of nodes that was generation the traffic. In both
data collections there were only a total of three nodes. One of the nodes was the server
while the other two nodes were the clients. Figure 5.3 shows that the data was somewhat
consistent. The average was about 12 kbps, which is half that of infrastructure. But this
was to be expected due to the reduced number of nodes. I roamed the halls with the
server in the same manner used with the infrastructure scenario and tried to say within the
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same bounds. Again the data was consistent throughout the collection and there were no
surprises with the background traffic.

Figure 5.3 Ad hoc Background Data

Figure 5.4 Ad hoc Attack Data

The attack also came from two nodes going to one. As Figure 5.4 shows, after 240
seconds the throughput goes to 0. This continues for a while and eventually comes back
up (which is not shown in this figure). The attack crippled the ad hoc network for a
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period of time showing that it was not as robust I would have expected. Others attempts
at attacks using fewer packets eventually showed the same results.

5.1.3 Dynamic-Link Switch
In this network setup, which can be seen in Appendix C, the Dynamic-Link switch served
as the gateway through which the different networks communicated. Software is
supposed to be able to configure the bandwidth that is specified by the user. The problem
with this setup is that there must be a problem with the program because through
numerous experiments I was not able to determine the correct bandwidth that was setup
to be allowed through the switch.
The way the switch worked, in order for packets to be allow through they had to
have enough tokens to cover the total number of bits in the packet. There were three
items that were configurable. They were the arrival rate of the packets, the number of
tokens that could be held in the token buffer, and the number of bytes a token can
support. The allowable bandwidth was supposed to be a simple multiplication of the
arrival rate and the number of bytes per token.
Figure 5.5 show the data collected when I attempted to run only background
traffic. This data was for the most part consistent with what I noticed the past. The
average rate was 2I kbps, and since the setup was similar to the infrastructure setup, it
did not bother me that the numbers were close. After this data was collected I then
attempted to collect data for the attack traffic. This data is shown in Figure 5.6. I noticed
the gaps in the test and tried to do some bandwidth calculations to allow a high
bandwidth throughput. This is where the problems started with this scenario. My
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calculations did not agree with the results I received. I checked with others who were
working with the switch and they were having similar problems. We concluded that there
is currently no way to determine, definitely, the allowable bandwidth once configured.

Figure 5.5 Dynamic-Link Switch Background Data

Figure 5.6 Dynamic-Link Switch Attack Data
Due to this conclusion I could not determine if the switch if functioning correctly or not
in this scenario. Yes, just looking at the data I can see that a possible attack has occurred
just from the variance from the background data and the attack data. But the accuracy of
the data and the possibilities is not sufficient to come to a definite conclusion.
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5.2 Comparison of Different Scenarios

In each if the scenarios it can easily be determined from the data collected that an attack
has occurred. The variance in the data from the background traffic to the attack traffic
shows that something did occur. More bandwidth was utilized in each of the scenarios
and the data seemed to be consistent, at least in the first two networks. Overall the
variance from background data to attack data was similar in all three different network
setups, which was satisfying. They were not exactly the same, but they were not different
by an obscure amount. The scenarios are consistent. More needs to be done with the
dynamic-link switch, however, to ensure that it is correct in achieving its main purpose,
bandwidth configuration.

CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION

The research was a success. The goal was to determine if network intrusions had
bandwidth effects of three different types of network setups. These setups were
infrastructure, ad hoc, and dynamic-link switch. Through data analysis it was determined
that the effects could be seen in all three different setups. There is some question on the
validity of one network setup, dynamic-link switch, due to the fact that I was not able to
confirm that the bandwidth configuration worked correctly. Keeping that in mind, the
results were still consistent with what was found in the other network setups.
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CHAPTER 7
USER MANUAL
This is a simple user manual that can be used to guide you through the many different
steps I've done during this research. There are three different parts. The first part is setup.
This involves making sure that the different both have the correct IP addresses and can
communicate with each other. If you know the network to which the node belongs, check
the IP address to ensure it is part of that network. This can be done from MSDOS.
On the command line of MSDOS type ipconfig. This will give you the IP address
of the node. If the address is part of the correct network then try to ping the other nodes in
the same network and in other networks to ensure connectivity. If it is not part of the
correct network then you must give the node the correct address. This is done by pressing
the right button of the mouse while it is over the my network places icon on the desktop.
This brings up a list of options that can be selected. Click the work properties and this
brings up a window. In this window there is an icon, which is labeled Local Area
Connection. Right click this icon and again select properties. This action will bring up
another window with at least one, maybe more, tab.
Under the general tab there are several components that can be selected. Highlight
the component that reads Internet Protocol (TCP/IP). Then click the properties button in
this window. Again another window will show which will allow you to change the IP
address. Click the radio button next to the statement Use the following IP address. Input
the correct IP address, subnet mask, and default gateway that will allow it to be part of
the network. Once this is done click the okay button to close the windows, the first
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window that was opened must be closed by pressing the X in the top right corner. Once
again go to MSDOS and attempt to ping nodes in the same network and other networks.
The next step is to start the client server programs. Both if these programs are
started from MSDOS. Find the location of the programs and get to that directory in
MSDOS, the names client.exe and server.exe. Type the name of the program you would
like to start, please remember that the server program must be started before the client
program. If you type client and press enter on the keyboard, it will start the client
program. This program will ask you several questions such as the IP address of the
server, the port on which the server is listening, etc. The questions are rather simple and
easy to follow. If you type server and press enter on the keyboard the program will only
ask on what port would you like to listen.
In order to collect data Windump must be started to capture all the packets. This is
also started in MSDOS. The command line should be pointing to the directory in which
the program windump.exe is located. Then you must type "windump —i2 —s 6000 —w
c:\folder\filename.tcpdump" . In this example folder represents the folder that will store

the file and filename represents the name of your file. Once you press enter on the
keyboard, the program will start listening for any traffic that will come to the node. To
stop the program, which can be done at any time you must press Ctrl + C. The data will
be automatically stored in the file specified. To read the data you must open a program
called ethereal and load the file from the location where it's stored. The ethereal program
either has a shortcut on the desktop or in the programs menu of the windows start icon.
The next item explained is using the scan script I created using recorder. To use
this script is rather easy. The only problem is that in order to transport it to another node
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involves a little manipulation of the program. It is currently setup on one of the nodes and
the instructions give below apply to this computer. The instructions will be the same for
any other node you transport it to, but you must make sure that the same folders exist in
the same areas on the new node. The recorder program can be retrieved from either the
shortcut on the desktop or under programs in the windows start menu. Once the program
is open you must press the load button. This will allow you to find the program you
would like to run. This will automatically bring up a folder called Curtis. In this folder
there is a program titled Nmap scenario. Click on this program and press ok. This will
load the program into the recorder application.
Pressing the replay button starts the script. This will start the first of many
windows in which you will have to put information. The first window will request the
filename in which all the other files will be saved. The next screen asks you the IP
address of the network you would like to scan. Then there are several screens that will
follow requesting information regarding what type of scan you would like to run. In order
to understand the many different possibilities of attacks that are available, read the help
file of the Nmap program, which has a short cut on the desktop. The last screen of the
program gives you the location and names of the different files that are created. This will
help you find the files when you are ready to retrieve them.
Now the program works on its own to complete the requested scan. It does this by
opening and starting windump, opening and starting Nmap, and saving all the scenario
information to the appropriate files. Once the scenario has stopped you must press Ctrl +
C to stop windump. All the files that were created are now available for your viewing.
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These files contain the tcp data in windump, the scenario setup information, and the
results of the scenario.
The last part of the experimentation involved using the data gathered from the nap
scenario to attempt other kinds of attacks. There are many different types of attacks that
can be attempted and I leave the choices up to you. So far I believe that there are about
200 attacks available, please see the professor, for your use. Many of them seek for
weaknesses in the operating systems that are present on the nodes. The choice is yours;
just remember to start windump before implementing the attack to ensure that you collect
the data. Running background traffic is also an option and if chosen should be started
prior to any attack attempts.

APPENDIX A
INFRASTRUCTURE NETWORK

This is the first network that was tested in research. There are four different networks
Inter-connected by a layer 3 switch. The wireless network is connected via an access
point. This unit is connected to a hub, which is then connected to the layer 3 switch.
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APPENDIX B
AD HOC NETWORK

This network setup features the different laptops interacting with each other without the
use of an access point. The laptops scan the different channels every 5 seconds in search
of another laptop with the same SSID so they can communicate.
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APPENDIX C
DYNAMIC-LINK SWITCH NETWORK

This network setup uses a computer with a dynamic-link software that in suppose to
inter-connect different networks. The switch should also be configurable it order for the
user to set the desired bandwidth. All the different networks connect to a port in an
Ethernet card on the switch.

45

REFERENCES
1. Goerzen, J. (2000). Linux Programming Bible. Foster City, CA: IDG Books
Worldwide, Inc.
2. Lin, T., Midkiff, S. F., & Park, J. S. (2002). A Dynamic Topology Switch for the
Emulation of Wireless Mobile Ad Hoc Networks. IEEE Computer Society
Digital Library, LCN'02, 791-798.
3. McClure, S., Scambray, J., & Kurtz, G. (2001). HACKING EXPOSED Network
Security Secrets & Solutions (3 rd ed.). New York: Osborne/McGraw-Hill.
4.

Northcutt, S., Cooper, M., Fearnow, M., & Frederick, K. (2001). Intrusion Signatures
and Analysis. Indianapolis, In: New Riders.

5. Northcutt, S., Novak, J. (200I). Network Intrusion Detection An Analyst's
Handbook (2nd ed.). Indianapolis, In: New Riders.
6. Rappaport, T. S. (1996). WIRELESS COMMUNICATIONS Principles & Practice.
Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall.
7.

Schwartz, M. (1987). Telecommunication Networks Protocols, Modeling and
Analysis. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company.

8. Tanenbaum, A. S. (I996). Computer Networks (3 rd ed.). Upper Saddle River, NJ:
Prentice Hall.

46

